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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Minnesota Supreme Court recently held in State v. LopezRamos that an interpreter’s translation of a defendant’s foreign language
1

statements during a police interrogation did not implicate the Confrontation
Clause. 2 The Lopez-Ramos court applied the language conduit theory to
determine an interpreter’s translated statements were attributable to the
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defendant. 3 Finally, the court concluded that because the defendant was the
declarant of the statements, the statements were not hearsay. 4
This Paper begins with a historical overview of hearsay, the
Confrontation Clause, the right to an interpreter, the limited right to
confront an interpreter, and the common law development of
Confrontation Clause tests in America. 5 Then, it explains the facts and
procedural posture of Lopez-Ramos. 6 Next, this Paper argues that LopezRamos’s approach to interpreters’ translated statements is based on flawed
precedent. 7 This Paper contends that Lopez-Ramos failed to acknowledge
the changing demographics of the United States as justification for adopting
a unified approach to this issue. 8 Additionally, the majority’s
misconstruction of language translation led to its distinguishing of LopezRamos and applicable case law. 9
Therefore, to make the law more unified and protective of
defendants’ rights, this Paper argues the court should adopt a disciplined
approach: interpreters must be subject to cross-examination under the
Confrontation Clause. 10 Finally, this Paper concludes the Lopez-Ramos
decision will likely lead to continued violations of foreign language speakers’
due process rights. 11
II.

A.

HISTORY OF THE RELEVANT LAW

Origins of the Hearsay Rule

Hearsay is defined as an out-of-court statement offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. 12 Generally, hearsay is inadmissible evidence. 13
A hearsay analysis can be broken down into four parts. 14 First, a “statement”
is either an oral or written assertion, or nonverbal conduct if it is intended
as an assertion. 15 Second, a “declarant” is the person who made the

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d at 420.
Id. at 423.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
MINN. R. EVID. 801(c).

Id. at 802.

Casen B. Ross, Clogged Conduits: A Defendant’s Right to Confront His Translated
Statements, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1931, 1936 (2014).

14

15

MINN. R. EVID. 801(a).
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statement. 16 Third, the statement is made out of court. 17 Fourth, the
statement offered must have been made to prove “the truth of the matter
asserted.” 18
However, a statement satisfying the four conditions above may be
admissible as non-hearsay if it is either a witness’s prior statement or a
statement offered against a party-opponent. 19 A witness’s prior statements
are admissible if the declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination
regarding the statement, and the statement satisfies one of four conditions. 20
A statement that is offered against a party-opponent to the litigation may be
admissible if it is either “the party’s own statement, in either an individual
or a representative capacity . . . or . . . a statement by the party’s agent or
servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment,
made during the existence of the relationship.” 21
The hearsay rule began developing in the sixteenth century, but it
did not fully advance until the early eighteenth century. 22 In fifteenth-century
England, attorneys commonly “confer[ed] privately with witnesses outside
of court” and refrained from calling such witnesses at trial. 23 Chief Justice
Fortescue explained the standard treatment of hearsay: “[i]f the jurors come
to a man where he lives, in the country, to have knowledge of the truth of
the matter, and he informs them, it is justifiable.” 24 Due to the
discouragement of calling witnesses to trial, juries in the late fifteenth century
16
17
18
19

Id. at 801(b).
See id. at 801(c).
Id.
Id. at 801(d). But see State v. Brist, 812 N.W.2d 51, 54–55 (Minn. 2012) (citing Bourjaily

v. U.S., 483 U.S. 171, 182–84 (1987)) (indicating the admission of 801(d)(2)(E) statements
does not violate the Confrontation Clause because the admissibility requirements for
801(d)(2)(E) statements “are ‘identical’ to the requirements for admissibility under the
Confrontation Clause”).
MINN. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) (noting the statement must be either: “(A) inconsistent with the
declarant’s testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial,
hearing, or other proceeding . . . or (B) consistent with the declarant’s testimony and helpful
to the trier of fact in evaluating the declarant’s credibility as a witness, or (C) one of
identification of a person made after perceiving the person . . . or (D) a statement describing
or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or
condition or immediately thereafter”).
Id. at 801(d)(2)(A), (D). The rule also allows admittance of a statement made by a partyopponent if “the party has manifested an adoption or belief in [the] truth” of the statement,
or the statement was made “by a person authorized by the party to make a statement
concerning the subject,” or the statement was made “by a coconspirator of the party.” Id. at
801(d)(2)(B), (C), (E).
John H. Wigmore, The History of the Hearsay Rule, 17 HARV. L. REV. 437, 437 (1904).
Deborah Paruch, Testimonial Statements, Reliability, and the Sole or Decisive Evidence
20

21

22
23

Rule: A Comparative Look at the Right of Confrontation in the United States, Canada, and
Europe, 67 CATH. U. L. REV. 105, 108 (2018).
Wigmore, supra note 22, at 440.

24
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received a “counsel report” which described “what had been or would be
said by persons not called or not put on the stand.” 25
However, by the early eighteenth century, opposition regarding the
admission of out-of-court statements at trial arose. 26 Initially, objections
regarding the admission of hearsay statements stemmed only from those
accused of crimes. 27 Some judges began to recognize the insufficient veracity
of out-of-court statements, but nevertheless continued to admit hearsay. 28
Eventually, juries’ dependence on out-of-court statements as the primary
source of evidence in trials led to an increase in challenges regarding the
validity of verdicts because the verdicts relied on untrustworthy hearsay
statements. 29 As a result, courts started to question the common practice of
admitting hearsay. 30 Toward the end of the seventeenth century, the practice
of admitting hearsay statements, whether made under oath or not, “was
abandoned in favor of one that required the testimony of the [declarant] in
court.” 31
In 1603, Sir Walter Raleigh’s trial for treason presented “one of the
earliest recorded” and most infamous examples of hearsay. 32 Raleigh was
accused of “joining the . . . Main Plot to depose James I and to place
Arabella Stuart on the throne.” 33 The trial involved the admission of a
statement made by Sir Walter Raleigh’s alleged accomplice, Lord
Cobham. 34 Lord Cobham provided a witness statement “before the Privy
Council and in a written letter” regarding Raleigh’s role in a plot to kill the
English King. 35 Despite Raleigh’s objections to the admission of Lord
Cobham’s statements, the jury heard the statements and subsequently
convicted Raleigh. 36 The court sentenced Raleigh to death, which resulted
in his execution. 37
In modern times, hearsay, like the testimony in Raleigh’s case, is
generally inadmissible as evidence at trial. 38 Despite this general bar, there
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Id. at 440–41.
Id. at 448.
Id. at 444.
Id.
Id. at 441–43.
Id. at 441–42.
Paruch, supra note 23, at 110.
Ross, supra note 14, at 1936 (citing David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 S.

CT. REV. 1, 38 (2009)).
Ross, supra note 14, at 1936; see Sklansky supra note 32, at 38.
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44 (2004) (discussing the Raleigh trial).
Hon. Daniel B. Shanes, The Crawford Confrontation Clause: Governmental Involvement
is Key to Testimonial Hearsay, 96 ILL. BAR J. 574, 575 (2008).
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
Sklansky, supra note 32, at 38.
See Ross, supra note 14, at 1937 (noting the exceptions for hearsay’s admissibility under “a
federal statute, a contravening Supreme Court rule, or the FRE”).
33
34
35

36
37
38
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are several exceptions permitting admission of hearsay evidence. 39 The
Minnesota Rules of Evidence, similar to their federal counterparts, provide
exceptions permitting admission of hearsay when the declarant is available
but the availability of the declarant is immaterial, 40 or the declarant is
unavailable. 41

B.

Confrontation Clause

The Confrontation Clause, in the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, intersects with hearsay rules because the Confrontation
Clause “allows a defendant to cross-examine a person providing testimonial
hearsay offered against him, but this right does not attach to admitted
evidence that is not hearsay.” 42 The Sixth Amendment guarantees “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
with the witnesses against him.” 43 Minnesota has an almost identically
worded confrontation clause in Article I, section 6 of its constitution. 44
The right to confront a witness is generally known to be derived
from the common law of England. 45 However, there are indications that the
right originated from Roman law. 46 The concept of the Confrontation
Clause existed in seventeenth-century England before it was transported to
the United States. 47 Historical readings demonstrate that the Confrontation
Clause serves “to ensure [the] reliability of evidence.” 48 Courts have
emphasized that the reliability of evidence must be tested through “the
crucible of cross-examination,” which is consistent with the Framers’
intent. 49

39
40

MINN. R. EVID. 803, 804.

Id. at 803 (listing numerous exceptions for when statements are not excluded by the hearsay

rule, “even though the declarant is available as a witness”).
Id. at 804 (listing numerous exceptions for when statements are not excluded by the hearsay
rule only “if the declarant is unavailable as a witness”). The legislature defined “unavailability
as a witness” as including situations in which the declarant is either ordered by the court not
to testify, continuously refuses to testify, lacks memory of the subject matter, is unable to
testify, or is absent. Id. at subdiv. (a)(1)–(5).
Ross, supra note 14, at 1937.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . .
. to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”).
See Marshall H. Tanick, Confronting the Confrontation Clause, 62 BENCH & BAR MINN.
16, 16 (Oct. 2005).
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015–16 (1988) (quoting Roman Governor Festus, “It is not
the manner of the Romans to deliver any man up to die before the accused has met his
accusers face to face, and has been given a chance to defend himself against the charges”).
See Tanick, supra note 45, at 16.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
41

42
43
44

45

46

47
48
49

Id.

756

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

Since its early adoption in the United States, the Confrontation
Clause has been invoked in numerous circumstances. 50 Today, the right of
confrontation is universally accepted as fundamental and is applied to the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. 51 The right to confront a witness is crucial in
criminal proceedings, particularly to “‘test[] the recollection and sift[] the
conscience of the witness’ and allow[] the jury to decide ‘whether he is
worthy of belief.’” 52
Under a modern Confrontation Clause analysis, “if the state wishes
to introduce hearsay at a criminal trial, the state must . . . show that the
declarant of the hearsay is unavailable for trial.” 53 Absent a valid reason for
the declarant’s unavailability, the declarant must be called to testify in court
and be cross-examined by the defendant. 54 If a reason for the declarant’s
unavailability exists, “the court must then make a determination of whether
the hearsay is testimonial or non-testimonial in nature.” 55 If the hearsay is
deemed testimonial, it is admissible “only if the defendant had a ‘prior
opportunity for cross-examination.’” 56 If the defendant did not have a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, the hearsay statement is
inadmissible. 57

C.

Right to An Interpreter

In the landmark case, Miranda v. Arizona, 58 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that criminal suspects must be protected against selfincrimination due to the “compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings.” 59
The Court found that any statements spoken during a custodial
interrogation without the “use of procedural safeguards” violate a person’s
constitutional right against self-incrimination. 60 As a result, the Court
required law enforcement officers to administer explicit warnings to
criminal suspects prior to any substantive questioning in custodial
See Tanick, supra note 45, at 17.
J. Charles F. Baird, The Confrontation Clause: Why Crawford v. Washington Does
Nothing More Than Maintain the Status Quo, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 305, 308 (2005).
Michael D. Cicchini & Vincent Rust, Confrontation After Crawford v. Washington:
Defining “Testimonial”, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 531, 534 (2006).
Id. at 537.
Id. at 537–38.
Id. at 538.
See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
Id.

50
51

52

53
54
55
56
57

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Id. at 458. A custodial interrogation occurs when “questioning [is] initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way.” Id. at 444.

58
59

60

Id.
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interrogations. 61 The Court indicated these explicit warnings to criminal
suspects must include the following: (1) they have the right to remain silent;
(2) anything they say can be used as evidence against them; (3) they have the
right to an attorney; and (4) the court will appoint an attorney if they cannot
afford one. 62
Despite the integral role the “Miranda warnings” play in our
criminal justice system, Spanish speaking suspects tend to be less protected
by this right. 63 Translations of the “Miranda warnings” can impact suspects’
understanding of their rights before they are subjected to custodial
interrogations. 64 Miranda requires that non-English speaking persons who
are read the “Miranda warnings” must also understand and comprehend
their rights. 65 Imprecise interpretation of the “Miranda warnings” can be
detrimental because inaccuracies “can result in unnecessary delays,
mistakes, and even wrongful convictions.” 66 Nevertheless, the Minnesota
Supreme court found that “Miranda warnings” do not need to be delivered
rigidly, as long as the warnings are substantively accurate. 67
Under Minnesota law, a person accused of a crime who is
“disabled in communication” 68 has the right to have a “qualified interpreter”
present at an interrogation. 69 Minnesota does not enforce strict education or
professional experience requirements to ensure adequate performance for
interpreters used in criminal proceedings. 70 Rather, the interpreter used
during an interrogation is required only to be “qualified,” not certified. 71
Despite the statutory requirement for interpreters to take an oath before
translating, 72 “the failure of [an] interpreter to take an oath does not merit
61
62

Id. at 444–45.
Id.

Alison R. Perez, Understanding Miranda: Interpreter Rights During Interrogation for
Spanish-Speaking Suspects in Iowa, 12 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 603, 603 (2009).
Id. at 617.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470–71.
Perez, supra note 63, at 617.
63

64
65
66

State v. Dominguez-Ramirez, 563 N.W.2d 245, 252–53 (Minn. 1997).
MINN. STAT. § 611.31 (2020) (defining “disabled in communication” as “a person who: (1)
because of hearing, speech or other communication disorder, or (2) because of difficulty in
speaking or comprehending the English language, cannot fully understand the proceedings
or any charges made against the person . . . is incapable of presenting or assisting in the
presentation of a defense”).
Id. § 611.32, subdiv. 2.
Id. § 611.33, subdiv. 1 (defining a “qualified interpreter” as a person who is “readily able
to communicate with the disabled person, translate the proceedings for the disabled person,
and accurately repeat and translate the statements of the disabled person”); see also State v.
Sanchez-Diaz, 683 N.W.2d 824, 835 (Minn. 2004).
MINN. STAT. § 611.33, subdiv. 1 (2020). For a more in-depth discussion of interpreter
qualifications see infra Section IV.B.
MINN. STAT. § 611.33 subdiv. 2 (2020).
67
68

69
70

71

72
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suppression.” 73 Law enforcement officers are required to ensure the
interpreter explains “all charges filed against the person, and all procedures
relating to the person’s detainment and release.” 74
The Minnesota Legislature enacted the interpreter statutes “to
provide a procedure for the appointment of interpreters to avoid injustice
and to assist persons disabled in communication in their own defense.” 75
The Legislature acknowledged the importance of interpreters during all
stages of criminal proceedings because “the constitutional rights of persons
disabled in communication cannot be fully protected unless qualified
interpreters are available to assist them in legal proceedings.” 76 However, the
Minnesota Supreme Court held “[t]his right is not a constitutional one.” 77

D. Restricted Right to Confront Interpreters
The intersection between the hearsay rules, the Confrontation
Clause, and the right to an interpreter is crucial because they significantly
impact an individual’s constitutional rights in criminal proceedings. The
Confrontation Clause and hearsay rules influence a suspect’s procedural
rights, which in turn serve to protect their substantive rights. 78 “When a
witness testifies to another person’s out-of-court statements, a hearsay issue
must be shown to exist for courts to consider whether the Confrontation
Clause applies.” 79 If the court determines the Confrontation Clause is
invoked, the witness may be subpoenaed to appear in court. 80
Recall that some statements are considered hearsay yet may be
admissible under a hearsay exception. 81 This distinction is important
because “it determines which evidence is subject to the Confrontation
Clause.” 82 The right to cross-examine a witness under the Confrontation
Clause is invoked when the witness is providing “testimonial hearsay”
against the accused, “but this right does not attach to admitted evidence that
is not hearsay, including evidence that falls within FRE 801(d) despite
meeting the four elements of FRE 801(a)-(c).” 83
73
74
75
76
77

Sanchez-Diaz, 683 N.W.2d at 836.

MINN. STAT. § 611.32 subdiv. 2 (2020).

Id. § 611.30.
Id.
Sanchez-Diaz, 683 N.W.2d at 835 (citing State v. Mitjans, 408 N.W.2d 824, 830 (Minn.

1987)).
Ross, supra note 14, at 1941–42; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
Ross, supra note 14, at 1935.
Id. (explaining that a subpoena may be invalidated if it is “unduly burdensome,
unreasonable, or oppressive”).
See MINN. R. EVID. 803, 804.
Ross, supra note 14, at 1937.
78
79
80

81
82
83

Id.
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Another layer of complexity is added because not only is the right
to an interpreter limited, but the right to confront an interpreter is even
more restricted. Under Minnesota law, an interpreter can be appointed
either in preliminary proceedings involving possible criminal sanctions or
confinement, or proceedings at the time of apprehension or arrest. 84
However, despite the role interpreters play during criminal
proceedings, the majority view in the United States is that interpreters are
not witnesses against defendants under the Confrontation Clause. 85
Consequently, hearsay exceptions are implicated because the majority of
courts find translated statements are admissible as “statements offered
against a party that is the party’s own statement.” 86 “When an interpreter is
used in the process of the interrogation, however, the police officer acting
as a witness at trial does not testify about the defendant’s statements – he
testifies about the interpreter’s statements.” 87 Therefore, query whether the
“hearsay exception that allows testimony about statements made during
police interrogation[s]” should apply or not. 88
Finally, there is no U.S. Supreme Court precedent that directly
proscribes the right to confront an interpreter used during criminal
proceedings. As a result, the complex interactions between the hearsay
rules, the Confrontation Clause, and interpreter laws intersect to restrict
defendants’ right to confront their interpreters.

E.

Conflicting Common Law Jurisprudence

Originally, the U.S. Supreme Court admitted hearsay as evidence
under the “reliability” test. 89 Under Ohio v. Roberts, if the state wanted to
introduce hearsay evidence against a defendant, the state was required to
show the declarant of hearsay statements was unavailable for trial. 90 If the
declarant was not available for trial, the Court found that the hearsay could
be admissible if it “bears adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’” 91 If a witness’s
hearsay was deemed unreliable, the witness was subject to cross-examination
under the Confrontation Clause. 92 Reliability was determined by either a
MINN. STAT. § 611.32 (2018).
State v. Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d 414, 420 (Minn. 2019) (reviewing the majority view).
Id. at 424 (citing MINN. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A)). This includes statements made by a
criminal suspect during a police interrogation.
John Kracum, The Validity of United States v. Nazemian Following Crawford and its
Progeny: Do Criminal Defendants Have the Right to Face Their Interpreters at Trial?, 104
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 431, 435 (2014).

84
85
86

87

88
89
90
91
92

Id.
See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
Id. at 65.
Id. at 66.
See id.
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“particularized guarantee of trustworthiness” or the evidence must have
fallen “within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.” 93 The “particularized
guarantee of trustworthiness” test granted judges unfettered judicial
discretion that was vague, subjective, and led to inconsistent results. 94
In the landmark case Crawford v. Washington, 95 the Supreme
Court abrogated the “reliability” test from Ohio v. Roberts, and instead
adopted the “testimonial” standard. 96 In Crawford, a man convicted of
attempted murder and assault appealed his conviction on the theory that his
wife’s statements to police officers were improperly admitted. 97 Crawford’s
wife made statements to the police that indicated her husband’s attack was
not in self-defense, which refuted Crawford’s main defense. 98 Crawford’s
wife invoked marital privilege under Washington state law and refused to
testify at trial. 99 As a result, Crawford did not have an opportunity to crossexamine his wife. 100
The Court unanimously held that “testimonial” hearsay, like
Crawford’s wife’s statements, is barred by the Confrontation Clause. 101 The
Court determined testimonial hearsay is admissible only if the witness is
unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
witness. 102 Although the Court left “testimonial” undefined, it noted
“testimonial” hearsay includes “affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confessions.” 103 Notably, the Court found that “statements taken by police
officers in the course of interrogations are also testimonial under even a
narrow standard.” 104
Post-Crawford jurisprudence reflects the inherent difficulty in
determining the reach of the Confrontation Clause—especially regarding
interpreters as witnesses against criminal defendants. In Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 105 the Court determined that forensic analysts who created
93

Id.

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67–69 (2004) (acknowledging that the reliability test
was a “[v]ague standard [and was] manipulable” because “judges, like other government
officers, [cannot] always be trusted to safeguard the rights of the people”).
94

95
96
97
98
99
100
101

Id.
Id. at 51–54.
Id. at 38, 40.
Id. at 39–40.
Id. at 41.
Id.
See id. at 51–53 (noting the Sixth Amendment language “witnesses” against the accused,

meaning those who “bear testimony,” as justification for adopting the testimonial standard).
Id. at 54.
Id. at 51 (noting testimonial as “a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose
of establishing or proving some fact” including those statements that “declarants would
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially”).
Id. at 52.
557 U.S. 305 (2009).
102
103

104
105
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reports regarding substances seized from Melendez-Diaz were adverse
witnesses against the defendant. 106 The Court found that the analysts’ reports
were affidavits, which “fall within the ‘core class of testimonial statements’”
covered by the Confrontation Clause. 107 Consequently, the Court
determined that the defendant had a constitutional right to cross-examine
the forensic analysts. 108 The Court emphasized that “[t]here is wide
variability across forensic science disciplines with regard to techniques,
methodologies, reliability, types and numbers of potential errors,” which
justify the use of confrontation to test “analysts’ honesty, proficiency, and
methodology.” 109
In Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 110 the Court reaffirmed MelendezDiaz and held that the defendant had a right to confront the analyst who
certified his blood-alcohol analysis report. 111 The Court determined the
analyst was a witness who should have been subjected to cross-examination
under the Confrontation Clause, similar to the forensic analyst in MelendezDiaz. 112 Again, the Court noted that documents created and used for
evidentiary purposes and “made in aid of a police investigation, rank[] as
testimonial.” 113 The Court asserted that “the comparative reliability of an
analyst’s testimonial report drawn from machine-produced data does not
overcome the Sixth Amendment bar.” 114 Lastly, the Court rejected the
notion that unsworn statements should be treated differently than sworn
statements for purposes of Confrontation Clause analysis. 115
In State v. Caulfield, 116 the Minnesota Supreme Court did not
apply the language conduit theory when it considered whether analysts’
reports constitute testimonial evidence under Crawford. 117 The court found
Id. at 308–11. The Court rejected the notion that there is a “third category of witnesses,
helpful to the prosecution, but somehow immune from confrontation.” Id. at 314.
Id. at 310 (finding the certificates were created to serve as evidence to prove facts in the
criminal proceeding).
Id. The Court noted that “[f]orensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of
manipulation.” Id. at 318.
Id. at 320–21.
564 U.S. 647 (2011).
See id. at 652.
Id. at 659–63 (recognizing that defense counsel’s questions could have revealed the
analyst’s “incompetence, evasiveness, or dishonesty”).
Id. at 664.
Id. at 660–61 (finding that such “representations, relating to past events and human actions
not revealed in raw, machine-produced data, are meet for cross-examination”).
Id. at 664 (emphasizing Crawford’s determination that “any construction of the
Confrontation Clause that would render inadmissible only sworn ex parte affidavits, while
leaving admission of formal, but unsworn statements” is unreasonable because doing so
“would make the right to confrontation easily erasable”).
722 N.W.2d 304 (Minn. 2006).
Id. at 308–09.
106

107

108

109
110
111
112

113
114

115

116
117
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that the admission of a Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) laboratory
report without allowing the defendant an opportunity to confront the analyst
was contrary to his Sixth Amendment rights. 118 The court determined the
laboratory report mirrored the “types of statements about which the Court
in Crawford expressed concern.” 119 As a result, the court reversed and
remanded the judgment. 120
II.

A.

THE LOPEZ-RAMOS DECISION

Facts and Procedural Posture

In May 2016, the State charged Cesar Rosario Lopez-Ramos with
first-degree criminal sexual conduct. 121 Law enforcement discovered LopezRamos’s unlawful conduct when a county child protection worker contacted
police regarding the suspected sexual abuse of a twelve-year-old child. 122
Then, Worthington Police Officer Daniel Brouillet began an
investigation. 123 During the investigation, the victim and her parents
identified Lopez-Ramos as the only suspect. 124
After police officers contacted Lopez-Ramos and he agreed to
provide a statement to police, an officer transported Lopez-Ramos to the
county law enforcement center. 125 While in an interview room, the officer
started a recording system and called the AT&T LanguageLine, a foreign
language translation service, and requested a Spanish interpreter. 126 After the
officer placed the call on speakerphone, the Spanish interpreter conducted
the interview in sequential interpretation. 127 During the course of the
interview, Lopez-Ramos admitted he sexually assaulted the victim on one
occasion. 128
118
119
120

Id. at 306–07.
Id. at 309 (finding the report was “clearly prepared for litigation”).
Id. at 307.

State v. Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d 414, 415, n.1 (Minn. 2019) (“Lopez-Ramos was
charged with the sexual penetration of a victim under 13 years of age when he was more than
36 months older than the victim.”); see also MINN. STAT. § 609.342 subdiv.1(a) (2018).
State v. Lopez-Ramos, 913 N.W.2d 695, 699 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018).
121

122

Id.
Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d at 415.
Id.
See id. at 415, n.1 (Lopez-Ramos’s first language is Mam, his second language is Spanish,
and he is not fluent in English); see LanguageLine Solutions, Over the Phone Interpreting
Services,
https://www.languageline.com/interpreting/on-demand/over-the-phone

123
124
125
126

[https://perma.cc/M8JF-953T].
Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d at 415 (explaining that sequential interpretation means “the
officer asked a question in English, the interpreter translated the question from English to
Spanish, Lopez-Ramos responded in Spanish, and the interpreter translated the response
from Spanish to English”).

127

128

Id.
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After the interview, officers arrested and charged Lopez-Ramos. 129
Lopez-Ramos pled not guilty, and the case proceeded to a jury trial. 130 The
morning his trial was scheduled to start, Lopez-Ramos objected to the
admission of his recorded translated statements on Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause and hearsay grounds because the State was not going
to call the interpreter to testify during the trial. 131 The district court asked the
State to make a foundational offer of proof regarding the interpreter the
police used during Lopez-Ramos’s interview. 132 In response, the State
explained that neither the interpreter’s identification nor location were
identified. 133
The district court admitted the translated statements because they
did not violate the Confrontation Clause or hearsay rules as the interpreter
was acting as a language conduit. 134 The district court relied on the Nazemian
factors to determine the interpreter acted as a language conduit and found
the statements were attributable to Lopez-Ramos as the declarant. 135 As a
result, the district court overruled Lopez-Ramos’s objection. 136
During the jury trial, the officer testified that Lopez-Ramos
responded to the translated questions without requesting clarification from
the interpreter. 137 Additionally, the officer testified that Lopez-Ramos
admitted he sexually assaulted the victim. 138 The video recording of the
interview, which depicted Lopez-Ramos’s ability to fully participate in the
interview, was admitted into evidence and played for the jury. 139 During the
video, Lopez-Ramos did not demonstrate confusion, and he did not express
misunderstanding of the questions the officer asked and the interpreter
translated. 140
During the trial, the victim testified that Lopez-Ramos sexually
penetrated her. 141 “Lopez-Ramos testified in his [own] defense and denied

129
130
131
132
133

State v. Lopez-Ramos, 913 N.W.2d 695, 700 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018).

Id.
Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d at 415–16.
Id. at 416.
Id. (noting that the State argued the lack of verification stemmed from Lopez-Ramos’s

prior failure to challenge the accuracy of the translation).
Lopez-Ramos, 913 N.W.2d at 700. The Court in Nazemian relied on several factors to
determine whether an interpreter’s statements should be attributed to the defendant under
a language conduit theory. United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 527 (9th Cir. 1991).
For an in-depth discussion of the Nazemian factors see infra Section IV.C.

134

135
136
137
138
139
140
141

Id.
Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d 414, 416 (Minn. 2019).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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having any sexual contact with the victim.” 142 During his testimony, LopezRamos alleged he was intoxicated during the interview and did not
understand some of the officer’s questions throughout the interview. 143 On
cross-examination, Lopez-Ramos admitted he understood the officer’s
questions and the translation. 144 “On December 15, 2016, the jury found
Lopez-Ramos guilty of first-degree [criminal sexual conduct].” 145 The district
court convicted Lopez-Ramos and sentenced him to 144 months in
prison. 146
Lopez-Ramos appealed the decision, and the Minnesota Court of
Appeals upheld the district court’s ruling. 147 First, the court held the
Nazemian factors were properly applied to determine the interpreter’s
translation was attributable to Lopez-Ramos. 148 Second, the court held the
Confrontation Clause did not apply because Lopez-Ramos was the
declarant, thus he could not be denied the opportunity to confront
himself. 149 Finally, the court concluded that the statements were admissible
over Lopez-Ramos’s hearsay objection because the statements could be
categorized as admissions by a party-opponent under Minnesota Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(2). 150

B.

The Majority Opinion

Lopez-Ramos appealed the appellate court’s decision, arguing the
admission of his translated statements violated the Confrontation Clause
and that the translated statements were inadmissible as hearsay. 151 The
Minnesota Supreme Court ruled in favor of the State on both issues. 152
Although the majority found that the facts of the case were materially
different from Crawford, the court applied the underlying principle of
Crawford to find that the interpreter was not a witness against LopezRamos. 153 The majority analyzed the process of language translation based
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150

Id.
Id.

State v. Lopez-Ramos, 913 N.W.2d 695, 700 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018).

Id.
Id. at 700–01.
Id. at 710.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 709–10.

State v. Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d 414, 417 (Minn. 2019) (arguing the admission of his
translated statements violated the Confrontation Clause and the translated statements were
inadmissible as hearsay).
Id. at 423.
Id. at 419–20 (finding the interpreter was not a witness against Lopez-Ramos because the
interpreter does not bear testimony like the wife in Crawford did, and language translation
“does not transform the interpreter into a witness against the defendant”).
151

152
153
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on its simplified view of an interpreter’s role. 154 The court concluded that
Lopez-Ramos was the declarant of the admitted statements, thus his
Confrontation Clause rights were not violated. 155 The majority reasoned the
interpreter was acting as a language conduit, consistent with Nazemian. 156
The majority distinguished the case from Bullcoming v. New
Mexico and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts. 157 Again, focusing on the
“simple” process of translating a language, the court determined an
“interpreter is more like a court reporter” than a forensic laboratory
analyst. 158 Because the majority already held that Lopez-Ramos was the
declarant of the admitted statements, it found his hearsay challenge lacked
merit. 159 As a result, the court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. 160

C.

The Dissenting Opinion

The dissenting opinion written by Justice Hudson, joined by
Justices Lillehaug and Thissen, argued that the majority decision violated
“the Sixth Amendment by permitting the State to introduce testimonial
statements made by an unidentified interpreter . . . without calling that
interpreter as a witness.” 161 The dissent reasoned that the language-conduit
theory is unsupported by Minnesota precedent 162 and is undermined by the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts and
Bullcoming v. New Mexico. 163 The dissent drew parallels between Caulfield,
Melendez-Diaz, and Bullcoming to argue Lopez-Ramos’s conviction should
be reversed. 164 The dissent rejected the majority’s view that United States v.
Id. (declaring an interpreter’s role “is not to provide or vary context . . . [but] to relay what
the defendant said in another language”). The majority added that an “interpreter is simply
the vehicle for conversion” and asserted that an “interpreter simply makes the languageconversion process more efficient and effective.” Id. at 419.
Id. at 420.
Id. The majority agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Nazemian that “a generally
unbiased and adequately skilled” interpreter “simply serves as a ‘language conduit.’” Id.
(emphasis added).
Id. at 421–22.
Id. at 422 (insisting that both interpreters and court reporters translate one form of
communication to another, “conveying information but not adding context”).
Id. at 423.
154

155
156

157
158

159
160
161
162
163

Id.
Id. (Hudson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 425 (citing State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304 (Minn. 2006)).
Id. (Hudson, J., dissenting) (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009)

and Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011)).
Id. (comparing the primary evidence used in the stated cases and Lopez-Ramos was a
report, created by someone who was not called to testify, which was admitted and led to a
conviction). The dissent also highlighted the fact that the interpreter used during LopezRamos’s interview was never identified, including the interpreter’s full name and location.

164

Id.
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Charles and Taylor v. State were inapplicable, and instead asserted that both

cases support a finding against the language conduit theory. 165
The dissent acknowledged the complexities of language translation
while drawing parallels between “the translation process and between each
step of the chemical-analysis process . . . .” 166 The dissent emphasized
Crawford’s holding that the Confrontation Clause guarantees individuals the
right to cross-examine witnesses against them. 167 The dissent criticized the
majority’s boasting of sections 611.30 through 611.34 of the Minnesota
Statutes and the Minnesota Code of Professional Responsibility for
Interpreters because “those protections are irrelevant to a Confrontation
Clause analysis” and “Lopez-Ramos did not receive those protections.” 168
The dissent concluded that the interpreter was the declarant of the hearsay
statement, the statement was testimonial, and the district court erred when
it denied Lopez-Ramos’s motion to suppress the statement. 169 The dissent
asserted that Lopez-Ramos’s conviction should have been reversed and
remanded for a new trial—where the State could have offered the “live
testimony of the AT&T interpreter, or [brought] a different interpreter . . .
[to] translate Lopez-Ramos’s recorded statement.” 170
Lopez-Ramos’s petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme
Court was denied on January 13, 2020. 171
IV.

ANALYSIS

The majority erred by applying the Nazemian test to determine
the interpreter in Lopez-Ramos was acting as a language conduit. 172 Even
though the court reflected on the importance of interpreters in the criminal
justice system, 173 the court failed to consider the changing demographics of
the United States. 174 The court’s oversimplified construction of language
Id. The dissent notes that the language conduit theory requires judges to “‘make a
threshold determination of the interpreter’s honesty, proficiency, and methodology without

165

testimony from the one witness whose testimony could best prove the accuracy of the
interpretations—the interpreter himself or herself.’” Id. (citing Taylor v. State, 130 A.3d 509,

539 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016) (emphasis added)).
Id. at 426 (including adding context and nuance, applying knowledge, and potentially
making mistakes throughout the process).
Id. at 427.
Id. at 428 (highlighting that the interpreter in this case did not take an oath before
translating Lopez-Ramos’s statements and was not subject to a code of conduct).
Id. at 429.
166

167
168

169
170

Id.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lopez-Ramos v. Minnesota, 140 S. Ct. 845 (2020) (No. 195936).
Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d at 420.
Id. at 419–20 (reviewing MINN. STAT. §§ 611.30–.34 (2018) and CODE OF PRO. RESP. FOR
INTERPRETERS IN MINN. STATE CT. SYS. Canon 1).
See infra Section IV.A.
171

172
173

174
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translation misguided its decision to apply the language conduit theory. 175 As
a result of the implicit conflict between Nazemian and post-Crawford
jurisprudence, 176 the court should have adopted a disciplined approach to
determine whether interpreters’ translations constitute hearsay. 177
Consequently, the majority erred when it distinguished interpreters from
forensic analysts for the purposes of the analyses in both Melendez-Diaz
and Bullcoming. 178 Instead, the court should have rejected the language
conduit theory and mirrored other circuit court approaches like Taylor and
Charles. 179

A.

Changing Demographics of the United States

As the majority in Lopez-Ramos acknowledged, interpreters play
an incredibly important role in the criminal justice system. 180 However, the
court failed to acknowledge the changing demographics of the United
States. The court should have recognized the evolving demographics and
set clear precedent regarding the use of interpreters to ensure constitutional
protection for all foreign language speaking defendants. Certainty in this
area of law is crucial “in a country where over three million people cannot
understand English and where interpreters are used 350,000 times each
year in its courts.” 181
“In 1980, 23.1 million people spoke a language other than English
at home . . . .” 182 Whereas in 2010, the national census showed that over 60
million people reported they spoke a language other than English at
home. 183 According to the United States Census Bureau, “as of 2010,
approximately forty million foreign-born individuals reside in the United
States, an increase of approximately nine million over the same population

See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.C.; Taylor v. State, 130 A.3d 509, 539 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016)
(finding the Nazemian analysis fails to withstand “scrutiny under the Supreme Court’s current
jurisprudence”); see also United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1140 (9th. Cir. 2012).
See infra Section VI.D.
Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d at 421 (arguing interpreters do not add context while “simply
convert[ing] information from one language to another”); see also Melendez-Diaz v.
175
176

177
178

Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311–14 (2009) (holding forensic analysts are subject to the
Confrontation Clause because they are adverse to the defendant); Bullcoming v. New
Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 663 (2011) (holding the admission of an analyst’s certification
rendered the analyst a witness subject to cross-examination under the Confrontation Clause).
Taylor, 130 A.3d at 524; United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2013).
Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d at 419.
Kracum, supra note 87, at 434.
CAMILLE RYAN, AM. CMTY. SURV. REPS., LANGUAGE USE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011
3 (2013) (noting this was a 158% increase, while the population grew only 38%).
Id. at 3.

179
180

181

182

183

768

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

ten years earlier.” 184 More than twenty-two percent of those individuals
reported they spoke English either “not well” or “not at all.” 185
The majority of the population who reported speaking a nonEnglish language at home spoke Spanish. 186 The Census Bureau noted that
the percentage of the total United States population who spoke Spanish
“increased from 2005 to 2011.” 187 The largest numeric growth in languages
other than English spoken in the United States was for Spanish speakers. 188
Notably, in 2011, over fifty percent of individuals who spoke Spanish and
reported they spoke English less than “very well,” were below the poverty
line. 189
Mirroring the increasing number of Spanish speakers in the United
States, the number of Spanish speaking persons in Minnesota is also
rising. 190 In Minnesota, over ten percent of the state’s population reported
they spoke a non-English language at home in the 2010 national census. 191
But nearly nineteen percent of Minnesota’s total population reported they
spoke English either “not well” or “not at all.” 192 Almost ten years later,
based on the 2018 American Community Survey, approximately twelve
percent of Minnesotans spoke a language other than English at home. 193
In response to the increase in non-English speakers in Minnesota,
the Minnesota Judicial Branch attempted to improve interpreter access in
the courts. 194 The Minnesota Judicial Branch created the Court Interpreter
Program (CIP) in 1999 to address access to interpreters in Minnesota
courts. 195 The CIP is tasked with “interpreter testing and certification,
maintaining and publishing the interpreter roster, recruitment and training
of new interpreters . . . developing and implementing language access and
interpreter polices, [and] the training of court staff and judicial officers . . .
.” 196 The CIP coordinator collects court interpreter utilization statistics to
analyze the needs of court users in Minnesota. 197 However, interpreter use
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192

Kracum, supra note 87, at 431–32.
RYAN, supra note 182, at 3.
Id. (totaling over 37 million people who spoke Spanish or Spanish Creole).
Id. at 5.
Id. (indicating that 25.9 million more people speak Spanish in 2010 compared to 1980).
Id. at 9.
See id. at 11.

Id.
Id.

MINN. STATE DEMOGRAPHIC CTR., DEP’T. OF ADMIN., Immigration & Language,
https://mn.gov/admin/demography/data-by-topic/immigration-language/
[https://perma.cc/9Z2Q-22P2].
MINN. JUD. BRANCH, LANGUAGE ACCESS PLAN FOR THE MINNESOTA JUDICIAL BRANCH
7 (2016).
Id. at 12.
193

194

195
196
197

Id.
Id. at 13.
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reports and “U.S. Census reports do not always reflect the actual language
needs of the communities served by the court . . . .” 198
In 2014, the most common language for which interpreters were
used in Minnesota courts was Spanish. 199 “Spanish speakers account[ed] for
55% of the non-English needs of Minnesota court users, and is usually at
the top of most district courts’ top languages . . . .” 200 At the end of 2012,
there were over 92,000 non-citizen inmates in federal and state prisons. 201
Consequently, there was a 13.8% increase in the number of annual
interpretation events in federal district courts. 202 In fiscal year 2013, district
courts reported that they used interpreters more than 330,000 times,
compared to approximately 325,000 times in fiscal year 2012. 203 Spanish was
the most commonly used language for interpreters in federal district courts,
comprising over 96% of interpreter use during 2012 and 2013. 204
Although access to interpreters is heavily regulated in Minnesota
courts, the same is not necessarily true for interpreters used during
interrogations. 205 The Minnesota Judicial Branch imposes an “order of
preference for utilization” of interpreters based on their certification. 206 The
Minnesota Judicial Branch focused its efforts on ensuring proper training
and certification for interpreters used in the courts, rather than the early
stages of criminal proceedings. The lack of strict requirements for
interpreters used outside of court hearings is problematic for non-English
speaking individuals who need an interpreter immediately following arrest
because the quality of the interpreter is likely at its lowest in the earliest
stages of the criminal proceedings due to the low certification
requirements. 207 Unfortunately, the early stages of criminal proceedings, like

Id. (noting individuals “may not be availing themselves of court services precisely because
of a real or perceived lack of language access resources in the district courts”).
Id. at 8.

198

199
200
201

Id.
Id. at 41.

Kracum, supra note 87, at 432.
ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., PUBLIC ACCESSIBILITY AND SERVICE ANNUAL REPORT
(2013),
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/public-accessibility-and-service-annualreport-2013 [https://perma.cc/ECX9-R4Z8].
202
203

Id.
Compare MINN. STAT. § 611.32, subdiv. 2 (2018), with State v. Sanchez-Diaz, 683 N.W.2d
824, 835 (Minn. 2004) (finding interpreters only need to be “qualified” not certified), and
MINN. JUD. BRANCH, supra note 194 at 17 (asserting the Minnesota Judicial Branch’s policy
204
205

is to “provide qualified spoken-language . . . interpreters . . . in all court proceedings”).
MINN. JUD. BRANCH, supra note 194 at 17, n.27. The Minnesota Judicial Branch
prioritizes the use of certified interpreters based on availability. “If there is no certified
interpreter available after a diligent search . . . courts then look to employ another roster
interpreter.”
See infra notes 228–32 and accompanying text.
206

207
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custodial interrogations, frequently form the foundation for convictions and
eventual loss of liberty.
Therefore, as the need for interpreters and the subsequent number
of interpreters used in the criminal justice system increases, there must be a
unified approach to challenges regarding the admission of interpreters’
translations. A unified approach to treat interpreters as witnesses against
criminal suspects, regardless of which stage the interpreter was used during
the case, will ensure equal protection of criminal suspects’ constitutional
rights.

B.

Language Translation is an “Art not a Science”

Language interpretation is a highly challenging task and is not as
simple and straightforward as the majority in Lopez-Ramos presents. 208
Notably, linguistic scholars “reject the notion that there are one-to-one
equivalencies between languages.” 209 Language translation inherently
invokes the interpreter’s discretion, 210 which undermines the majority’s
holding that language translation is merely converting words from one
language to another “without adding conte[xt].” 211
Language translation “has been defined as the replacement of
textual material in one language [the source language] by equivalent textual
material in another language [the target language] . . . .” 212 There are three
different modes through which interpreters translate: consecutive,
simultaneous, and sight translation. 213 During consecutive interpretation,
“the interpreter waits until the source language speaker pauses, then renders
the original meaning in the target language.” 214 In simultaneous
interpretation, “the interpreter conveys the target language message at the
same time as the source language speaker.” 215 Whereas sight translation is
“the oral rendition into a target language of material written in a source
language.” 216
Contrary to popular belief, most bilingual individuals are not
competent enough to serve as interpreters. 217 Instead, an interpreter must
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216

State v. Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d 414, 419 (Minn. 2019).
Ross, supra note 14, at 1959.
Id. at 1954.
Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d at 421.
Ross, supra note 14, at 1966.
Elena M. de Jongh, Court Interpreting, 82 FLA. BAR J. 20, 26 (July/Aug. 2008).

Id.
Id.
Id.

Charles M. Grabau & Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Protecting the Rights of Linguistic
Minorities: Challenges to Court Interpretation, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 227, 234–35 (1996);
see also MINN. JUD. BRANCH, supra note 194, at 18 (asserting that bilingual staff may not be
217

used for interpreting in courtroom proceedings).
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“perform two functions simultaneously in the field of language and
communication that otherwise are always carried out separately: speech (the
expression of our ideas) and understanding (our comprehension of the
ideas of the other speaker).” 218 In order to translate another language into
English,
An interpreter must listen to what is being said,
comprehend the message, abstract the entire message from
words and the word order, store the idea, search his or her
memory for the conceptual and semantic matches, and
reconstruct the message (keeping the same register or level
of difficulty as in the source language). While doing this,
the interpreter is speaking and listening for the next
utterance of the language to process, while monitoring his
or her own output. 219
Language interpretation in the legal field should be subject to the
highest form of scrutiny. Interpreters in legal proceedings play a significant
role in ensuring criminal suspects’ constitutional rights are not infringed. 220
An interpreter’s “presence and participation allow an individual who does
not speak or understand English to meaningfully participate in the judicial
proceeding.” 221 The interpreter should work diligently to “place the nonEnglish speaker, as closely as is linguistically possible, in the same situation
as the English speaker” during court proceedings. 222 The “importance of
language in law makes it doubly odd that courts would be so cavalier in
considering the ability of languages to interrelate.” 223 While general common
words may be easier to translate, legal terminologies “rel[y] on specificity
and exactness.” 224
Minnesota imposes strict requirements for interpreters used during
court hearings. 225 First, court interpreters must pass an “English-only written
exam, which assesses knowledge of the English language, court related terms
and usage, and ethics and professional conduct.” 226 Second, interpreters
de Jongh, supra note 213, at 25 (emphasizing that the “two processes are performed by the
same person, often simultaneously”).
State v. Montoya-Franco, 282 P.3d 939, 943 (Or. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Cathy Rhodes,
Court Certification, 1 ACCESS TO JUST. J. 1, 2 (Summer 1999)).
See People v. Carreon, 198 Cal. Rptr. 843, 847 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (“Various courts and
commentators have noted denial of interpreter services impairs not only the defendant’s due
process rights, but also his rights to confront adverse witnesses, to the effective assistance of
counsel, and to be present at his own trial.” (citations omitted)).
Grabau & Gibbons, supra note 217, at 241.
218

219

220

221
222
223
224
225
226

Id.

Ross, supra note 14, at 1965.
Id. at 1968.
MINN. JUD. BRANCH, supra note 194, at 22.
Id.
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must pass an “oral interpreting examination that measures knowledge, skills,
and abilities in the three modes of interpreting (sight translation,
consecutive, and simultaneous).” 227 Third, court interpreters must
“demonstrate good character and fitness as evidenced through a
background check.” 228
Unlike the certification requirements for court interpreters in
Minnesota, there are no certification requirements for interpreters used
during custodial interrogations. 229 This is problematic considering
interpretation during interrogations includes the discussion and
consideration of Constitutional rights, “and mistranslation (for example, one
that conveys a denial of guilt as an admission) may violate due process.” 230
Interpreters regularly disagree about the proper translation of a
statement because interpreters’ use of discretion while translating ultimately
impacts the end result of a translation. 231 Interpreters invoke their discretion
to use “more (or less) polite language; . . . inject or omit hesitation; use more
formal . . . language; or introduce ambiguities.” 232 Some languages reflect
cultural concepts that cannot be translated into other languages. 233 Similarly,
interpreters regularly misinterpret testimony due to words that may appear
similar “because they are derived from a common form but whose meanings
in certain contexts are often completely different.” 234 Additionally, “both the
translated interaction and the translator’s own cultural background influence
the manner in which statements are translated.” 235
In sum, foreign language interpreters exercise judgment and add
context similar to the work of forensic analysts. 236 Interpreters are not
exempt from making mistakes, nor are interpreters unsusceptible from
227
228
229

Id.
Id.
Compare MINN. STAT. § 611.32, subdiv. 2 (2018), with State v. Sanchez-Diaz, 683 N.W.2d

824, 835 (Minn. 2004) (finding interpreters only need to be “qualified” not certified).
Right to an Interpreter, 7 Minn. Pracs., Crim. L. & Proc. § 6:29 (4th ed.); see Ross, supra
note 14, at 1934, 1965; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469–70 (1966)
(emphasizing the right to counsel during interrogations is “indispensable to the protection of
the Fifth Amendment privilege” because unequivocally understanding the consequences of
statements made during interrogations is paramount).
Ross, supra note 14, at 1965.
Id. at 1965–66.
See Ellen Frances Saunders, 11 Untranslatable Words from Other Cultures, MAPTIA
BLOG (Maptia Aug. 21, 2013), http://blog.maptia.com/posts/untranslatable-words-fromother-cultures [https://perma.cc/8D43-HM33] (describing eleven words that cannot
be translated directly into English, such as the Japanese word komorebi, which describes the
sunlight that filters through the leaves of trees).
de Jongh, supra note 213, at 27 (explaining “false or party false cognates”).
Ross, supra note 14, at 1972.
Id. at 1978; see also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318 (2009) (noting
“[f]orensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of manipulation”).
230

231
232
233

234
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succumbing to external pressures to interpret statements in favor of one
party. Accordingly, the court should have treated an interpreter like a
forensic analyst in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming to find that interpreters
are witnesses subject to cross-examination. 237

C.

Inconsistent Jurisdictional Approaches

Courts across the United States use different approaches to
determine whether an interpreter’s translations are hearsay and whether the
interpreter is subject to the Confrontation Clause. 238 The twenty-nine-yearold holding in United States v. Nazemian 239 caused significant conflict postCrawford. Even though the Court in Crawford did not explicitly overrule
Nazemian, the two cases are implicitly at odds with one another. 240 The
inherent conflict between Nazemian and Crawford caused a circuit split: the
Eleventh Circuit rejected Nazemian, 241 while other circuits continue to apply
the Nazemian multifactor analysis post-Crawford. 242
After Ohio v. Roberts, the Ninth Circuit adopted a different
approach to hearsay and Confrontation Clause issues. 243 As a threshold
matter, the Nazemian court considered whether the interpreter or the
defendant should be viewed as the declarant of the out-of-court
statements. 244 The court relied on several factors to determine “whether the
interpreter’s statements should be attributed to the defendant under . . . [a]
conduit theory.” 245 The factors included reviewing “which party supplied the
interpreter, whether the interpreter had any motive to mislead or distort, the
interpreter’s qualifications and language skill, and whether actions taken
subsequent to the conversation were consistent with the statements as
translated.” 246 The court found that an interpreter’s translation of a
defendant’s out-of-court statements did not constitute hearsay because the
State v. Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d 414, 425 (Minn. 2019) (Hudson, J., dissenting) (noting
the majority adopted the nonprecedential language-conduit theory).
See Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, Application of Confrontation Clause Rule to
Interpreter’s Translations or Other Statements—Post-Crawford Cases, 26 A.L.R. 7th Art. 1
(2017).
948 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1991).
Taylor v. State, 130 A.3d 509, 537 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016); see also U.S. v. Orm Hieng,
679 F.3d 1131, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012).
See United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319, 1327–29 (11th Cir. 2013).
Ross, supra note 14, at 1955–56 (noting courts in the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits
follow the Nazemian approach).
Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522.
Id. at 525–26 (finding that there would be no Confrontation Clause issue if the defendant
was viewed as the declarant because a defendant cannot be “denied the opportunity to
confront herself”).
Id. at 527.
237

238

239
240

241
242

243
244

245
246

Id.
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defendant was the declarant of the statements. 247 The court concluded that
neither a Confrontation Clause nor a hearsay issue arose. 248

1. Acceptance of Nazemian
In United States v. Vidacak, the Fourth Circuit found an interpreter
acted as a language conduit, thus it declined a Confrontation Clause
challenge. 249 The court determined the general rule is “an interpreter is no
more than a language conduit” with an exception that “is applied ‘where the
particular facts of a case cast significant doubt upon the accuracy of a
translated confession.’” 250 After the court reviewed the Nazemian multifactor
test, 251 the court found the “application of the narrow exception is not
warranted . . . and the translation did not create an additional level of
hearsay.” 252 The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning for finding the interpreter in
Vidacak was acting as a language conduit stemmed from general principles
of reliability. 253 Ignoring the reality of language translation, the court found
the absence of evidence proving the interpreter’s “motive to mislead or
distort” to be persuasive. 254
Four years later, the Fourth Circuit again applied the language
conduit theory to determine the admission of an interpreter’s translations
did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights. 255 However, the court
did not explicitly rely on Nazemian to determine the interpreter was a
language conduit. 256 Instead, the court found Crawford illustrative as
showing testimonial statements can be admissible “for purposes other than
establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” 257 Consequently, the court
rejected the defendant’s Confrontation Clause challenge because the
hearsay statements at issue were “introduced as prior inconsistent
statements.” 258
247
248

Id. at 528.
Id.

United States v. Vidacak, 553 F.3d 344, 352 (4th Cir. 2009) (relying on United States v.
Martinez-Gaytan, 213 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2000), which in turn relied on Nazemian, 948 F.2d
522).
Id. (quoting Martinez-Gaytan, 213 F.3d at 891).
Id. at 352 (citing Martinez-Gaytan, 213 F.3d at 892, which cited to Nazemian, 948 F.2d at
525–27 to review four factors including: “1) which party supplied the interpreter; 2) whether
the interpreter had a motive to mislead or distort; 3) the interpreter’s qualifications and
language skills; and 4) whether actions taken subsequent to the conversation were consistent
with the statements translated”).
249

250
251

252
253
254
255
256
257
258

Id.
Id.
Id.

United States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d 233, 248 (4th Cir. 2013).

Id.
Id. (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 n.9 (2004)).
Id.
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The Fifth Circuit similarly relied on the language conduit theory to
determine whether an interpreter’s translations were not hearsay in violation
of the Confrontation Clause. 259 The Eighth Circuit also found that an
interpreter is generally “viewed as an agent of the defendant; hence the
translation is attributable to the defendant as his own admission and is
properly characterizable as non-hearsay . . . .” 260 Although the Eighth Circuit
court did not consider the officer who interpreted the defendant’s
statements a language conduit, it denied the defendant’s hearsay appeal
under the applicable standard of review. 261
Marking a shift in post-Crawford jurisprudence, the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged the tension between Crawford and Nazemian while it
considered a foreign language speaking defendant’s Sixth Amendment
rights. 262 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit declined the opportunity to reject
the Nazemian threshold analysis. 263 In United States v. Orm Hieng, the
court held that the admission of a law enforcement agent’s testimony
regarding statements the defendant made through an interpreter did not
violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. 264 The court affirmed the
defendant’s conviction under the language conduit theory from
Nazemian. 265 In reaching its decision, the court applied the Nazemian
factors because it could “apply Nazemian without running afoul of
Crawford.” 266
The court declined the opportunity to adopt an approach similar
to Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming because “[t]hey do not address the
question whether, when a speaker makes a statement through an interpreter,
the Sixth Amendment requires the court to attribute the statement to the
interpreter.” 267 Consequently, the majority of the Ninth Circuit panel
distinguished an interpreter’s translation of a defendant’s statements from a
laboratory analyst’s report. 268 The Ninth Circuit continued to follow
Nazemian, noting its hesitance to abrogate circuit precedent absent “clearly

Escalante v. Clinton, No. 09-41055, 2010 WL 2802369 at *498 (5th Cir. July 16, 2010).
United States v. Sanchez-Godinez, 444 F.3d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting United
States v. Da Silva, 725 F.2d 828, 831 (2d Cir. 1983)).
Id. at 961 (finding the error, if any, regarding the admission of the translated hearsay
statements was harmless).
United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1140–41.
Id. at 1140.
Id. at 1139.
Id. at 1140.
Id. (finding the consequence is that “[n]one of these cases . . . are in direct conflict with
our holding in Nazemian”).
259
260

261

262
263
264
265
266
267

268

Id.
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irreconcilable” decisions between the Supreme Court and prior circuit
precedent. 269
The Ninth Circuit’s application of the language conduit theory was
premised on the assumption that “accurate interpretation by an individual
with no motive to mislead or distort does not create a layer of hearsay.” 270
However, this assumption ignores the reality of language interpretation—
which is inevitably subject to both intentional and unintentional errors. 271 As
Judge Berzon argued:
Translation from one language to another is much less of
a science than conducting laboratory tests, and so much
more subject to error and dispute. Without the ability to
confront the person who conducted the translation, a party
cannot test the accuracy of the translation in the manner in
which the Confrontation Clause contemplates. 272
Judge Berzon’s concurring opinion in Orm Hieng challenged the
validity of Nazemian and the language conduit theory. 273 Judge Berzon
viewed Nazemian’s holding as based “on a pre-Crawford understanding of
the unity between hearsay concepts and Confrontation Clause analysis.” 274
Judge Berzon also highlighted the significant tension between Nazemian’s
holding and the U.S. Supreme Court’s holdings in Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming. 275 Importantly, Judge Berzon recognized Nazemian’s “implicit
trust in the accuracy and independence of interpreters” and the Supreme
Court’s more recent “scrutiny of forensic reports.” 276
Judge Berzon’s concurring opinion reflects the danger in the Ninth
Circuit’s continued application of Nazemian. The Ninth Circuit’s reliance
on its twenty-nine-year-old holding in Nazemian, despite clear conflicts
between Nazemian and recent Supreme Court precedent, continues to
muddy the waters in this important area of law.

2.

Rejection of Nazemian

Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s approach, the Eleventh Circuit
determined the language conduit theory should not apply to challenges
regarding foreign language interpreters as witnesses under the
Confrontation Clause. 277 The Eleventh Circuit correctly rejected Nazemian
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277

Id. at 1140–41; see also Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003).
Kracum, supra note 87, at 437.
See de Jongh, supra note 213, at 27.
Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1149 (Berzon, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kracum, supra note 87, at 451.
United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319, 1327–28 (11th Cir. 2013).
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and the language conduit theory because an interpreter engages “some
independent analysis when translating the defendant’s statements,” thus the
interpreter is considered a separate declarant. 278
In United States v. Charles, the Eleventh Circuit held that a
defendant had the right to cross-examine the interpreter who translated his
statements during a police interrogation. 279 The court determined the
interpreter was the declarant of the defendant’s translated statements, thus
a police officer’s testimony regarding the interpreter’s translation was
hearsay. 280 The court reasoned that the statements were easily categorized as
testimonial under Crawford because they were elicited during an
interrogation. 281
Importantly, the court acknowledged the complexities of language
translation to find that the interpreter’s statements could not be considered
identical to the defendant’s statements. 282 The court reasoned that, postCrawford, the language conduit theory is inapplicable because it is premised
on the court’s determination of the interpreter’s reliability, similar to the
reliability test used in Roberts, which Crawford overruled. 283 The court
emphasized that Crawford controlled its decision because Crawford
“rejected reliability as too narrow a test for protecting against Confrontation
Clause violations.” 284
The court explained its rationale for rejecting Nazemian was also
bolstered by Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming. 285 The court was particularly
persuaded by Melendez-Diaz because when “even the results of ‘neutral,
scientific testing,’ do not exempt the witness who performed the test from
cross-examination, certainly the Confrontation Clause requires an
Ross, supra note 14, at 1933; Charles, 722 F.3d at 1327 n.9 (“[The] interpreter’s otherwise
inadmissible hearsay statements bear upon the basic fact that the interpreter is the speaker
(declarant) of the out-of-court . . . statements that are being testified to in court by a third
party. And it is the declarant who is subject to the . . . Confrontation Clause.”).
Charles, 722 F.3d at 1323.
Id. (finding the interpreter was the declarant of the out-of-court English language
statements, and the defendant was the declarant of the out-of-court Creole language
statements).
Id. at 1323–24. The Charles court determined “testimonial” includes “‘[s]tatements taken
by police officers in the course of interrogations’ . . . but also ‘witness statements given to an
investigating officer.’” Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 1324. The court found that there were two different sets of testimonial statements
made by two different declarants “for purposes of the Confrontation Clause” analysis. Id.
The court reasoned that “the statements of the language interpreter and Charles are not one
and the same,” furthering the notion that “[l]anguage interpretation . . . does not provide for
a ‘one-to-one correspondence between words or concepts in different languages.’” Id.
(citations omitted).
Id. at 1327–28.
278

279
280

281

282

283
284
285

Id.
Id. at 1329–30.
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interpreter of the concepts and nuances of language to be available for crossexamination at trial.” 286 However, given the lack of clear binding precedent
from the Eleventh Circuit or the Supreme Court on this issue, the court
found the district court did not plainly err by admitting the statements
without allowing the defendant to confront his interpreter. 287
Similarly, in Taylor v. State, 288 the court reflected on post-Crawford
jurisprudence to determine a sign-language interpreter’s translation of a deaf
defendant’s testimony qualified as “testimonial” for purposes of the modern
Confrontation Clause analysis. 289 The court did not apply the Nazemian
multifactor analysis because “[u]nlike a three-judge panel from the Ninth
Circuit, this Court is not required to uphold prior Ninth Circuit precedent
that is in significant tension with Supreme Court jurisprudence.” 290 The
court found the Nazemian holding was incompatible with Crawford because
Nazemian “does exactly what Crawford forbids: it leaves ‘the Sixth
Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence’ and to
‘amorphous notions of ‘reliability.’” 291
In reaching its decision, the court analyzed four pillars upon which
Nazemian’s analysis rests. 292 First, the court found that “Nazemian uses
rhetorical sleight of hand to distract attention from the fact that an
interpreter makes assertions about the English meaning of what the
defendant has said in his or her own language.” 293 Second, the court asserted
that the language conduit theory “creates a legal fiction as to the identity of
the speaker.” 294 Third, the court determined Nazemian’s “analysis depends
upon an analogy to evidentiary rules regarding hearsay.” 295 Fourth, the court
highlighted that “Nazemian premises the admissibility of the absent

286
287
288

Id. at 1329.
Id. at 1331.

Taylor v. State, 130 A.3d 509 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016).

Id. at 521. The court noted that the “structured police questioning after a Miranda warning
carried as much formality and solemnity as the interrogation from Crawford.” Id. at 523.
Id. at 536.
Id. at 539 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004)).
Id. at 537 (asserting “none of which withstands scrutiny under the Supreme Court’s current
289

290
291
292

jurisprudence”).
Id. at 537 (acknowledging Nazemian failed to recognize that “interpreters must understand
what the defendant meant and remember what the defendant said while simultaneously
exercising judgment and discretion to convert one set of symbols to another without altering
what the defendant intended to convey”).
Id. at 537 (finding that the conduit approach “collapses the defendant and the interpreter
into a single witness for constitutional purposes”).
Id. at 538 (asserting that the Supreme Court recentered the Confrontation Clause analysis
to the Constitution, rather than the law of evidence).
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interpreter’s statements upon the apparent reliability of the
interpretations.” 296
The court concluded that Crawford, Melendez-Diaz, and
Bullcoming “illustrate[] the correct application of current law.” 297 As a result,
the court asserted that cross-examination is the proper means by which an
interpreter’s proficiency, honesty, or methodology can be tested. 298
Importantly, the court suggested that “Nazemian disregards the difficult
realities of real-time language interpretation . . . .” and refused to call an
interpreter a language conduit. 299 The court displayed clear disdain toward
the language conduit theory because it requires the court “to endorse a
fallacy or misconception that ignores the reality of language
interpretation.” 300

D. Disciplined Approach
Although the language conduit theory is the majority approach in
the United States, this Paper argues that it must be rejected in favor of a
more predictable and constitutionally protective approach. When an
interpreter’s translations are introduced at trial, the interpreter must be
viewed as the declarant of those translated statements. As a result, the
translated statements should be considered hearsay, “thereby affording the
defendant a right to confront his interpreter under the Confrontation
Clause.” 301
The Nazemian threshold test and language conduit theory are
simply an “[a]lternative means of determining reliability,” 302 a standard
which Crawford directly determined is inapplicable during Confrontation
Clause analyses. 303 Throughout post-Crawford decisions, the Supreme
Court clearly illustrated an intolerance for reliability as a standard for
Confrontation Clause challenges. 304 Rather, “it is the interpreter who is
Id. (reemphasizing that the Nazemian multifactor analysis is “akin to the unpredictable and
subjective multi-factor ‘indicia of reliability’ tests” which Crawford overruled).
Id. at 539–40.
Id. at 530; see also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318–21 (2009)
(identifying multiple ways in which cross-examination is crucial to expose dishonesty, bias,
errors, incompetence, or deficiencies in training, judgment, or methodology).
Taylor, 130 A.3d at 564–65.
Id. at 528.
Ross, supra note 14, at 1959.
Kracum, supra note 87, at 456.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61–62 (2004) (emphasizing that the Confrontation
Clause “commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a
particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination”).
United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319, 1330 (11th Cir. 2013) (reviewing post-Crawford
jurisprudence to conclude that the language conduit theory is precedentially unsupported).
The Eleventh Circuit strongly emphasized, “[t]he Supreme Court could not have been
296
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298

299
300
301
302
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subject to ‘the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional
demands,’ that is: confrontation.” 305
As the Court asserted in Melendez-Diaz, the Sixth Amendment
separates witnesses into two categories: “those against the defendant and
those in his favor.” 306 The Supreme Court categorically defined forensic
analysts as witnesses against the defendant because “regardless of their nonaccusatory nature,” they provide evidence contrary to the defendant. 307 The
Court reasoned that forensic analysts’ reports are not always the product of
neutral testing, but instead found “some of that methodology requires the
exercise of judgment and presents a risk of error that might be explored on
cross-examination.” 308
Similarly, the process of language translation requires the exercise
of judgment and discretion, which is inherently subject to errors. 309 As a
result, the Confrontation Clause presents the best method of “weed[ing] out
not only the fraudulent [interpreter], but the incompetent one as well.” 310
“Just because a statement is non-accusatory, unusual, or supposedly neutral,
does not remove it from the class of statements that require
confrontation.” 311 Rather, given the complex process of language translation,
and the important legal rights at stake when an interpreter is used during
criminal proceedings, confrontation provides the most consistent means to
ensure the utmost protection over defendants’ constitutional rights.
Consequently, the better course of action in Lopez-Ramos would
have been to remand the case for a new trial. 312 Ultimately, the court should
have found the interpreter was a witness under the Confrontation Clause,
and the interpreter’s translated statements constituted hearsay. The State
could have “offer[ed] the live testimony of the AT&T interpreter.” 313
Alternatively, Lopez-Ramos’s original Spanish statements could have been
admitted at trial, then both the State and Lopez-Ramos could either agree
to a translation of Lopez-Ramos’s statements, or each side could call its own
interpreter. Nonetheless, a remand would set the precedent that interpreters
are not immune from the Sixth Amendment and interpreters’ translations

clearer that reliability, absent cross-examination, is irrelevant for purposes of the
Confrontation Clause.” Id.
Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69).
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 313 (2009).
Kracum, supra note 87, at 445; see Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 313; see also Winbush,
supra note 238.
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 320.
See de Jongh, supra note 213, at 27.
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 319.
Kracum, supra note 87, at 447; see also Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 315–17.
State v. Lopez-Ramos, 929 N.W.2d 414, 429 (Minn. 2019) (Hudson, J., dissenting).
305
306
307

308
309
310
311
312
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constitute hearsay. At a minimum, this approach would lead to increased
consistency within foreign language criminal trials in Minnesota.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Minnesota Supreme Court was presented with an opportunity
to set a disciplined approach to challenges regarding the admission of an
interpreter’s translations of a defendant’s statements under the
Confrontation Clause and hearsay rules. 314 Instead, the majority improperly
determined that the interpreter was acting as a language conduit and found
Lopez-Ramos’s Sixth Amendment rights were not implicated. 315
Because the Spanish population in the United States has increased
significantly, courts should reevaluate their rulings regarding interpreters in
the legal system. Specifically, courts should acknowledge the discretion
interpreters use while translating languages and reject the language conduit
theory. Although some circuits have properly rejected the language conduit
theory, the Minnesota Supreme Court continued to adhere to clashing
precedent that could lead to many unwarranted violations of foreign
language speaking defendants’ rights. The Lopez-Ramos holding will
inevitably invite further unfettered judicial discretion by lower courts,
leaving little protection over foreign language speaking defendants’ right of
confrontation.

314
315

Id. at 415.
Id. at 420.
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